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San Cosme, Spain: 
Planning and Renewal o(a State Housing Area 
by Martin Wynn 
Abst/'act: The San Cosn1c Re~idential 
Estate \Vas built outside Barcelona, 
Spain, in the mid 0 1960s by the state-
run Syndical Housing Anthority 
to rehouse over seven thousand 
people, n1ost of them from cleared 
shanty towns on the Montjnic hill 
overlooking the city. Within five 
years of construction, the houses 
began to deteriorate rapidly and 
San Cosine has since bccon1e 
notorious as an exan1ple of _the 
,vorst aspects of State housing in 
Spain. This article examines in 
detail tlie planning and 
construction of San Cosine, anrl 
the successful ca111paign of the 
local residents' association to 
persuade central State authorities 
of the need to rebuild the estate. 
At the sa1ne tin1e, the article 
identifies the major socio-political 
nnd planning issues involved iu 
the San Cosine experience, that 
rnay be of relevance to other State 
housing projects in both the 
developed ond developing world. 
The Spanish Planning System 
The Land and Urban Planning Act of 1956 formed 
the basis for urban planning in Spain for the following 
two decades. The Act established an administrative 
hierarchy for urban plans at the municipal, sub-
regional, provincial, and national levels. Local councils 
were made responsible for drawing up Municipal 
Developn1cnt Plans, although in some cases, partic-
ularly in the larger cities, 1nunicip8.I authorities. could 
join togclher to dnnv up Sub-Regional Plans, some 
of which in fact pre-dated the 1956 Act. Such was the 
case in Barcelona, ,vhere a sub-regional plan for the city 
and the surrounding 27 municipalities had been 
approved in 1953, when the Greater Barcelona 
Planning Commission (GBPC) had also been 
fanned to 1nanage urban planning in the Greater 
Barcelona Sub-Region. The 1956 Act recognized this 
µIan and n1adc the local councils and the GBPC 
responsible for its enforce1nent. 
The 1956 Act, however, failed to provide any effective 
control over the growth of Spain's major cities for 
several reasons. Urban planning at the upper-tier 
levels has been virtually non-existent and has had little 
bearing on urban growth in the large metropolitan 
areas.' At the lower-tier levels, the municipal and sub-
regional authorities, ,vhich ,vere entrusted ,vith drn,v-
ing up and implementing urban plans, lacked the 
financial and technical resources to actively 
intervene in urban develop1nent and, in n1any cases, 
the political will to fulfill any effective development 
control role. A loophole in the 1956 Act enabled 
developers (in both the public and private sectors) 
to draw up "Local Plans," which could change land use 
classifications established in approved development 
plans.' 
At the sa1ne titne, central State authorities, each ,vith 
their o,vn invest1nent progra1ns, frequently inter-
vened \Vith non-coordinated develop111ents, that 
so1netitnes crossed established planning procedure 
and contradicted approved urban plans. Nowhere is 
this better illustrated than in the activities of the 
Syndical Housing Authority in the 1950s, 1960s, and 
early 1970s. 
The Syndical Housing Authority 
The Syndical Housing Authority (SHA) was 
founded in 1939 to provide State-subsidized housing 
for me1nbers of the State-run trade unions. It becan1e 
the 1najor national public housing authority in the 
Franco era, promoting over 300,000 houses in Spain during 
the period 1939-75, of which over 24,000 were in the 
Barcelona Sub-Region, \vhere there neve11heless re1nained a 
housing deficit of 118,000 dwellings in 1972,1 due largely 
to the continued 1nassive 111igration into the region 
throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. 4 
The- SHA was a Madrid-based authority under the wing of 
the Labour Relations Ministry but it worked closely with 
the National Institute of Hansing (a sub-section of the 
Ministry of Housing), which usually financed and directed 
land acquisition for SHA activities. The SHA provided, 
above all, "litnited cost 11 honsing5 for the Io,vest paid 
,vorkers and San Cosine ,vas one of three 11 0verspill 
Estates" ("Unidades Vecinales de Absorbcion") specifically 
built in the mid-sixties to re-settle shanty town dwellers 
(most of them in-migrants from the south and west of 
Spain) from Montjuic, a hill area overlooking the city. 
The SHA estates of the early and mid-sixties are 
generally regarded as the worst ever built by the SHA, 
111 tenns of the quality of their construction and 
design. Following the approval of the National 
Housing Plan in 1961, the Minist1y of Housing put 
the SHA in charge of the construction of over 
170,000 low cost houses in the country as a whole, and 
quantity rather than quality became the main 
criterion for SI-JA operations in the ensuing 
"boom" period. Bnt although San Cosme was 
undoubtedly one of the worst SHA estates ever built 
lhc vast tnajority of the SHA housing areas hav: 
experienced si1nilar, if less extre1ne, proble1ns 
associated ,vith the poor quality of house construction 
a11d inadequate service infrastructure. 
Montjuic and the residents' 
associations 
Montjuic has subsequently been developed by the 
Barcelona Council and private developers as a 1najor 
tourist and recreational area ,vith an a1nuse1nent 
park, sports installations, public gardens, and a variety 
of museums. Eight hectares were also ceded by the 
Barcelona Council to the State in 1971 for the 
installation of a television broadcasting center, and 
the Council, despite n1assive oppositio·n fro1n local 
residents and the Architects' Colleges, has used other 
parts of the hill area (screened from the city center) 
as municipal rubbish dumps. Thus, although this 
article focuses on procedural aspects of planning and 
development at the local level, it is worth noting that 
the San Cosine project can also be seen in the context 
of inner city renovation of ,vorking-class housing 
areas by the public administration and/or private 
developers that has invariably involved the re-
housing of residents in the city periphery where 
land values are tnuch lo,ver rind urban services and 
infrastructure often inferior. ' 
It ,vas precisely this insensitivity to resident 
needs that gave rise to the residents' association 
1nove1ncnt in Spain's n1ajor cities in the 1960s and 
1970s, which, as Bmja (1977) and Castells ( 1978) 
have pointed out, is one of the most developed 
1nove1nents of its kind in Europe. The San Cosine 
experience is of interest in this context also, as the 
struggle by the local residents 1 association to secure 
i111provc1nent, and then the total rene,val, of the 
San Cosme Housing Estate by central State 
authorities constitutes one of the n1ost successful and 
dra111atic residents' association protest ca1npaigns in 
Spain. 
The San Cosme case study 
The desig11atlo11 of St111 Cosine anti local council 
opposition 1963-4 
In July 1963, the National Institute of Housing 
(NIH) put other St ate bodies in charge of the 
construction of 6,500 houses and complementary 
service buildings in Barcelona, specifically to house 
people from Montjuic.6 On July 29th, the provincial 
(Ba_rcelona) delegate of the Ministry of Housing 
notified the Prat Council of the decision of the SHA 
to build 300 provisional dwellings on a 100 hectare.site 
(247.1 acres) in the municipality of Prat, 12 kilometers 
from the Barcelona city center. The Council was asked 
to supply information regarding land ownership and 
estate value, so that the expropriation procedure could 
go ahead. The Prat authorities did this in their reply 
of October 28th; at the same time, however, they 
expressed their dismay that a 100 hectare site should 
be chosen for the construction of only 300 houses 
and their opposition on the grounds that it 
contradicted the land use classifications for the area 
contained in the 1953 sub-regional plan. 
The Prat Council drew attention to the fact that 
the 1953 plan gave three different classifications to 
the designated area - " Pern1a11ent Agricultural 
Land," 11 Extensive Suburban Develop1nent," and 
"Special Airport Zone" (Figure 1) - and that 
development exceeding the specified limitations could 
only take place if a local plan was passed to change 
the land zone classifications as necessary. 1 Further, as 
the entire area consisted of agriculture land, a Roads 
and Services Project8 \Vould have to be drawn up and 
approved so that the necessary infrastructure and 
se1vices could be provided before house construction 
started, as was demanded by the 1956 Act. In 
addition, it was pointed out that the designated area 
contained so111e of the richest agricultural land in 
the province, which, because of the problems of 
drainage and of providing adequate foundations, ,vas 
scarcely suitable for residential development. 
In Februaiy 1964, the provincial delegate of the 
Ministry of Housing again wrote to the Prat Council, this 
time informing them that 3,000 dwellings' were lo be 
built within part of the previously designated area in 
Prat, and that the State was officially to occupy the land, 
follo,ving a hand-over cere111ony to take place on March 
13th. The Prat Council again strongly contested the legality 
of the proposals on the basis of the 1956 Act, and demanded 
that, as the · local council, they be consulted before 
expropriation take place, as stipulated in the Law of Limited 
Cost Housing of 1954. 10 
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Figure I. The growth of San Cosme, 1963-1973 
The Council also pointed out that 3,000 new 
d,vellings in Prat ,vould constitute an increase of 
approximately 15,000 people, almost as many as the 
existent population of 16,021, and that "an 
increase of such proportions would create enormous 
difficulties in the satisfactory prov1s10n of 
,nunicipal services and governn1ent as there ,viii 
not be the necessary financial compensation for 
this Council." 11 The Prat Council continued their 
can1paign against the San Cosme proposal 
throughout 1964 and early 1965, lobbying even the 
Vice-President of the government for an audience. 
This relentless protest by the local authority 
undoubtedly made an impact on the central St ate 
authorities. In March 1965, the NIH informed Prat 
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Council that it "had agreed to reduce the number of 
provisional dwellings to be built in Prat to 1,500 
instead of the 3,000 originally programmed." 12 Prat 
Council, on the advice of their legal advisors, 
accepted this as a reasonable compromise, and the 
SHA could now proceed with the construction of the 
ne,v housi.ng estate. 
Co11strnctio11 of Sm, Cosme, 1965-67 
Although no Local Plan or Roads and Services 
Project had been submitted to the Public Information. 
Stage, or followed the procedural course outlined in 
the 1956 Land and Urban Planning Act", the Prat 
Council contacted the SHA in March 1965, inviting 
them to discuss details of the San Cosme operation. 
In April, the SHA replied by forwarding copies of 
their plans and asking that the Prat authorities grant 
the necessary building permits, which the Council did 
in May 1965. By this time, the SHA had awarded the 
contract for construction to Colon1ina - Serrano S.A., 
a nationwide building contractor, and the foundations 
had been laid (Figure 3). In April 1965, however, the 
Aviation Ministry intervened ,vith an objection that 
necessitated the re-planning of about half the estate. This 
highlights the incredible lack of coordination between 
government 1ninistries, that ,vas in 1nany ways typical of 
State intervention in the Franco era. 
In October 1963, Prat Council had pointed out that 
part of the designated area encroached on land 
classified as "Special Airport Zone" in the 1953 
Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan. Now, the Aviation 
Ministry wrote to the SHA noting that construction was 
underway in this area, and warning them that 
should plans for future runway extension be 
approved, the houses would have to be demolished. 
The SHA clearly took the warning seriously. By May 
1966, a revised lay-out (Figure 2) had been drawn up 
and construction continued accordingly, 14 leaving 
almost half the 1965 foundations (those within the 
Special Airport Zone) to be abandoned. By 1967, 
construction of the two-story H-shaped and linear 
apartment blocks was complete, and by the end of 
1968, 7,215 people were living in San Cosme in the 
River Llobregat delta area, with over 5,000 of them 
having been removed from shanty towns on Montjuic. 
House deteriomt/011, 1970-74 
In the early 1970s, many houses in San Cosme 
began to show clear signs of deterioration, notably 
large surface cracks in the outer and inner walls. The 
San Damian Residents' Association (SDRA), 
representing the San Cosme residents, contacted the 
SHA and asked that the necessary repairs be made. In 
l 973, the River Llobregat broke its banks and 
flooded San Cosme, filling the house cellars with 
flood water that often contained sewage effluent. By 
no,v, the 1najority of San Cosine residents ,vere 
refusing to pay part or all of the mortgage 
payments that the SHA had set in 1969 for twenty-
to forty-year Joans, based on the subsidized cost of 
houses." The SHA had failed to carry out repairs, 
and relations between the SHA and the SDRA were 
further e1nbittered by the serving of eviction notices 
on son1c of the residents. 
1--fo,v ,vas it possible that these houses began to 
crack an.d crun1ble so soon after con1pletion of 
construction? As already noted, the Prat Council 
had pointed out in 1963 that the delta soils posed 
problems for the adequate provision of both drainage 
and house foundations. In a geological survey 
subsequently carried out in 1977 ,16 it was discovered 
that dellaic deposits extended to a depth of 40 
meters from the surface. The SHA had designed 
their houses on 11 egg-box 11 foundations, reaching only 
one 1ncter below· the surface_, ,vhich in theory could 
"float" in the soft delta clays, and thereby suppmt 
the two-storey apartment blocks above. But in 
practice, the 1nove111ent of the sub-soil ,vas so great 
that the foundations moved disproportionately, causing 
cracks to appear in both inner and outer ,valls of 
the apartn1etlts. Here, one could possibly place some 
bla111e on the Prat Council 1s technical planning office, 
which had reported favorably on the house design in 
April 1965, prior to the granting of municipal building 
ｾ＠ Shops 
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permits. But by then all formal planning procedure 
had been reduced to something of a farce by the 
illegality of the San Cosme operation over the 
previous t,vo years, and one can suppose that Prat 
Council, having just secured a reduction in the 
overall size of the housing estate from 3,000 to 1,500, 
was reluctant to push its luck. It must also be said 
that if statutory planning procedure had been 
followed, 17 Local Authorities and the general public 
would have had the opportunity to closely examine 
the plans for San Cosme, and that the technical aspects 
of the SHA's proposals would have been seriously 
questioned. In any case, the blame must surely 
rest fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the 
SHA which, as a State housing authority, should have 
ensured that the proposals for foundations were 
satisfactory, before submitting the plans to the Prat 
authorities. 
Throughout 1973, the SDRA pressed the SHA for 
urgently needed repairs, \Vhile a Barcelona 1ne111ber 
of the Spanish Parliament (E. Tarragona) took up the 
case with government authorities in Madrid. Finally, 
in November 1973, the NIH was authorized to draw 
up a repair progratn for San Cosine and in March 
1974, Constructora Internacional S.A., an international 
building contractor, ,vas given the stale contract for 
carrying out these repairs. But failure to arrive at an 
agree111ent ,vith residents over ,vhat fa1nilies should 
do while their houses were being repaired delayed 
Figure 2. 'fhe Syndical Housing Authority's revised plan for San Cosn1e, May 1966 
the start of operations until October l 974, when Mr. 
Tarragona again raised the 1natter in the Spanish 
Par I iament, demanding that the urgent problems in 
San Cosine be satisfactorily resolved. In a ,vritten reply, 
the President of the Spanish Parlia,nent con finned 
reports that because of ne,v esti,nates 18 on the 
total cost of repairs, the Government had decided to 
demolish the 1,500 houses built between 1965 and 
1967, and build approximately 3000 in their place. 
Instead of being repaired, San Cosme ,vas no,v to be 
rene,ved. 
The first re11e111"/ sche111e, 1974-5 
In 1974, the SHA was undergoing transition from 
a house prornotion and 1nanage1nent authority to an 
essentially estate management body within the Synd-
ical Organization, and after that time, they played 
very little part in proceedings. By early 1975, the 
NIH had prepared its own draft plan for the renewal 
of San Cosme (Figure 3). The new estate was to con-
sist of pre-fabricated star and linear-shaped .blocks of 
five and nine stories (c.f. the existing 2 storey blocks), to 
house 13,000 people. 
Meanwhile, in January 1975, the residents' asso-
ciations in SHA estates in Barcelona collectively 
petitioned the Ministry of I-lousing, demanding that 
they be allo,ved to set up "Co1n1nittees of Control 11 
to supervise all repair and rene,val schen1es. In 
March, the NIH officially rejected the idea, and stressed 
that "in no \Vay 1nay persons outside the 
Achninistration intervene actively in the realization of 
the Administration's progra1n1nes. 11 19 This tended to 
sour the reception of the NIH1s rene,val sche1ne in San 
Cosme, and relations worsened throughout 1975, 
as disagreements arose over pay1nent of re1noval and 
other costs to be incurred in imple1nenting the project. 
Further, problems surrounded the 80 I houses built by 
the SHA in 1971-3 to the south of the 1500 built 
between 1965 and 1967; 500 of these remained empty 
and the NIH proposed to move 500 families into these 
houses as pennanent residences to facilitate the phased 
detnolition-construction-rehousing operation of the 
renewal scheme. The habitable state of these 500 houses 
was put in doubt by an architect's report 
commissioned by the SORA. The report stated that 
the houses had 11great structural defects and n1any 
are considered uninhabitable." 20 
This was subsequently challenged in a report 
commissioned by the SHA, but following a series of 
bitter exchanges in the sum1ner and autun1n of 
1975, relations between the SORA and the housing 
authorities reached a ne,v crisis point. The rent strike 
continued (not just in San Cosn1e, but in a!Jnost all 
SHA estates in Barcelona), and the future of the 
renewal sche1ne remained uncertain. -
New initiatives in the post-Franco era 
In 1976, the first full year of the post-Franco era, a 
ne,v adn1inistration, and subtle but significant 
changes in political attitudes brought new impetus to 
the San Cosme rene,val sche1ne. Ne,v "social hous-
ing"21 legislation placed e1nphasis on making loans 
available to house buyers, representing a significant 
Housing in San Cosme, 1977. The repair of cracks in the outer walls was often undertaken by the residents themselves (Photo: M G Wynn). 
5-story blocks 
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Figure 3. The National Institute of Housing's plan for renewal in San Cosine, January 1975 
Houses /Juilt in the second phase of construction, 1971-73. These houses were the center of a dispute between the 
San Damian Residents' Association and the Syndical Housing Authority in 1975, when it was suggested that 500 
families from the first phase /1965-67) be permanently rehoused (Photo: M G Wynn). 
policy cluinge fro1n the constructor subsidy syste1n \Vhich had 
been lhe rnajor feature of previous state housing policy. More 
i1nportantly as regards San Cosn1e, it \Vas stated that "in 
exceptional C<'!ses, the National Institute of Housing may acquire 
or construcl ·social housing' the1nselves, using their o,vn 
funds ..... such exceptional cases include ..... house deterioration." 
22 This, then, provided a ne\v legislative fratnework \Vithin ,vhich 
renewal sche1nes could be financed by the NIH. 
At the same time (in July 1976), the Barcelona General 
Metropolitan Plan (GMDP) was definitively approved. This 
replaced the 1953 sub·regionc1I plan and \VclS of i1npo1tance to the 
San Cosine schen1e for t\VO reasons. First, it 1nade reference to 
the role of special plcins in the rene\val of existing areas. This 
type of plan had been introduced in the Land and Urban Planning 
Reform Act of 1976 as having the "objective of carrying out 
operalions in urban areas ain1ed at decongestion, creation of 
tn ban rind co111111unity serviceS, i1nprove1nent of unhealthy areas, 
traffic circulation, and environ1nental conditions ... "2J Second, 
the Gi\1.DP classified all San Cosine as a "previously re.planned 
zone .. " This classificalion ,vas intended for areas for ,vhich local 
plans had been dra\vn up and approved since 1953, resulting in 
lc1nd uses that contradicted the land use classifications for such 
areas in lhe 1953 sub-regional plan. Paradoxically, no local plan 
had ever been npp_roved for San Cosn1e, and yet San Cosine 
existed in contradiction to the 1953 classifications. What the 
1976 plan did ,vas to recognize fonnally the existence of San 
Cosme, even if the l<'lnd zone classification ,vas not strictly 
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appropriate. Therefore, by the end of 1976, the GMDP, the new 
State housing policy, and the Land and Urban Planning Rcfonn 
Act provided a ne,v leg::11, c1d1uinistrative and planning fra1ne,vork 
for the rene,val of San Cosine. 
The 11e11., re11eu1af sc/Je111e, 1976-7 
Throughout 1976, the SDRA continued to press local and 
central authorities for action in San Cosn1e. At the sa111e ti1ne, the 
SORA contracted cin advisory tean1 of architect planners (led by 
F. Calbet) ,vhich beca1ne incrensingly involved ,vith finding an 
alternative to the rene,val sche1ne proposed by the NIH in 
January 1975. In October 1976, Calbet's team presented an 
alternative plan to San Cosine residents in a public exhibition 
held in San Cosine. Follo,ving a series of n1inor adjust111ents, this 
was accepted as a ne,v draft plan for rene,val by the Minist1y of 
Housing in late 1976. 'fhis ,vas of considerable significance: it 
n1eant that the SDRA had effectively ,von its ca111paign to have a 
direct say in the plan-making process. This victory \Vas 
consolidated in February 1977, ,vhen an official contract was 
signed between the NIH and Calbet, stating that architects from 
both ca1nps ,vo1Ild ,vork together in dra,ving up a Special Pl::111 of 
Interior Reforn1 and a Roads and Services Project for all San 
Cosme, and a Building Project (detailed house design) for the 
first phase of renewal (Figure 4). The NIH was to finance the 
operation and hventy year loans ,vould be 1nade avc1ilable to 
residents for the long-ten~ purchase of the new houses. 
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Figure 4. The four phases of the special plan of interior refor1n for Sau Cosn1e, 1978. 
Construction ,viii stmt on the existing football pitch, enabling residents to move directly into their ne,v 
hon1cs. Their former ho1nes ,viii then be den1olished to nu1kc ,vav for the second phase of construction. 
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Figure 5. The Special P Ian of Interior Reform for San Cosme, 1978. 
By July 1977, the Special Plan of Interior Reform 
(Figure 5) had been completed. The 1500 houses built 
in the years 1965-7 were to be demolished and I ,784 
new houses built in their place in four-storey blocks 
enclosing central recreational areas. Construction was 
to start on the old football pitch as part of a four-
phase scheme whereby residents would move directly 
into their new houses and thereby avoid any enforced 
temporary residence elsewhere. By January 1978, after 
a series of 111eetings and discussions ,vith residents to 
deter1nine design details and the exact co1nn1unity 
service needs, the Roads and Services Project and 
Building Project for the first phase was also complete. 
The plan appro11,1! process, 1977-8 
According to Article 41 of the Land and Urban 
Planning Reform Act of 1976, the Special Plan of 
Interior Reform (SPIR) for San Cosme should have 
been initially approved by the Ministry of Housing, 
the11 submitted to the Public Information Stage for a 
month, with a further month for the Audience of 
Local Corporations, before being provisionally and 
definitively approved by the Ministry of Housing and 
Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona" re,spectively. 
But, as Figure 6 shows, the SPIR was not formally 
approved by the Ministry at all. 
It was accepted by them, and then forwarded to the 
Prat Council for the council "to proceed with the 
approval process, as outlined in Article 41 of the Land 
and Urban Planning Act of 9th April 1976." 25 
Paradoxically, as noted above, this was not in 
accordance with the referred to Act. The Ministry, it 
seems, was bending over backwards to avoid giving the 
impression of heavy-handed state intervention (such 
as had characterised events 1963-5) to such an extent 
that they were technically not following correct 
planning procedure. 
On October 17th, 1977, following reports by the 
Municipal Planning Department and the Committee 
of Construction and Installations of Prat Council, the 
SPIR for San Cosme was initially approved by Prat 
Council. Follo,ving announcen1ents on the Council 
notice-board and in the Official Bulletin of the Prov-
ince, the Public Information Stage was officially 
opened on November 17th. The Colonel-Director of 
Barcelona Airport and the Provincial Delegate of the 
Ministry of Public Works were asked to forward reports. 
These reached the Prat Council in January · and 
February of 1978, and stated no objection to the 
plan. No appeal at all was presented to the Council 
in the Public Information Stage, and the plan was 
therefore forwarded" to the Metropolitan Corpora-
tion of Barcelona for definitive approval. This was 
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Figure 6. The ph1n approval process in theory and in 
Lhe Special Plan of Interior Reform of 1977-8 (below) 
given on April 21, 1978. Following visits of Ministry 
Officials to Barcelona and to San Cosme itself, the 
~udgetary allocation for the first phase of the renewal 
Scheme was approved by the full cabinet on December 
J 5, 1978, and Dragados y Conslrucciones, a nation,vide 
building contractor, was awarded the contract for the 
first phase on March I, 1979. By October of that year, 
foundations for the new houses had been laid, with 
the first phase scheduled to be completed by mid-
!980. The battle of the residents' association and 
Calbet's tea1n lo get San Cosine rebuilt ,vas almost 
Mm. 
Summary 
The San Cosme case study illustrates in striking 
rnanner so111e of the ,vorst aspects of State housing in 
particular, and St ate intervention in general, in the 
franco era. All along, central State authorities have 
do1ninated developn1ents in San Cosn1e to such an 
l!xtent that formalized planning procedure has been of 
little consequence. In 1963-4, the NIH paid scant 
regard to the objections raised by Prat Council, even 
though they were quite legitimate according to 
planning and housing legislation. The San Cosme 
Dperation of the mid-sixties typified the heavy-
handed central State intervention that did so n1uch to 
\Jndennine the credibility of the Madrid Govern1nent in 
Catalonia in the Franco era. 'fhe NIH· also ,vent back 
on its word, assuring Prat Council that only 1,500 
houses would be built, and then constructing a further 
800 (through the SHA) in the early 1970s. 
The bungling in decision-making must also be 
something of an object lesson. First, over half of the 
original foundations had to be abandoned, because of 
reality for the Local Plan of 1963-5 (above), and for 
the objection of the Aviation Ministry, which ironically 
took as its planning guidelines the land zone 
classifications of the 1953 sub-regional plan (which 
had been ignored by the NIH and the SHA). Then, in 
the early and mid-seventies, the change of policy 
from repair to renewal revealed the absence of a full 
comprehension of the problems involved, and was also 
accompanied by an about face by Ministerial author-
ities on the question of whether these houses were or 
were not supposed to be permanent dwellings. If, as 
the President of the Spanish Parliament asserted in 
1975, these houses were meant to provide "temporary 
shelter only~"i7 then th~ sarne is presu1nably true 
of the other two 11 overspill estates11 built at Po111ar 
and Cinco Rosas -in the mid-sixties, and yet no renewal 
schemes exist for these estates. 
The San Cosme operation of the mid-sixties is 
perhaps best seen within the context of the political, 
eco110111ic, and social realities of the age. Barcelona 
had a housing deficit (in the municipality alone) of 
an estimated I 00,000 houses houses" in 1960, and the 
continued flow of migrants into the city" put great 
strains on the urban structure, ,vith shanty towns 
springing up in most of the green areas and on waste 
land (near railways, cemeteries, industrial installations) 
in and around the city. With the blessing of the 
Barcelona Council, which ,vas anxious to exploit the 
tourist potential of Montjuic, the central State authorities 
,vent for a quick, no-nonsense solution to the shanty 
problem, that in fact had a lot more to do with their 
desire to rid the Barcelona city center of unsightly shanty 
towns than any humanitarian housing policy. The 
shanty dwellers were moved to poorly constructed 
dwellings in a variety of peripheral locations, 
including San Cosme on the mosquito-ridden 
Llobregat delta. 
But perhaps \Vhat the San Cosme experience shows 
above all is that housing projects that are totally in-
sensilive to the needs an<l \vishes of residents are un-
likely to be successful in the long term. This is well 
illustrated by the contrast between the attempts of the 
NIH to effect repair, and then rene\val, sche1nes in 
the period 1973-75 and Calbet's collaboration with 
the Sau Cosme residents after 1975. In the former, 
implen1entation \Vas th\varted by disagree1nent be-
t\veen residents and state authorities over te1nporary 
residences, re1noval expenses, and resident partici'-
pation in the direction of operations that \Vere to be 
carried out by an international building contractor 
employed by a central state authority. In the latter, 
Calbet, who had been designated by the residents' 
association to direct the plan-making process on their 
behalf, drew up proposals that catered as far as pos-
sible to individual resident needs, and yet 1net the 
budgetary restrictions imposed by the NIH. Calbet 
also insisted that local building contractors be used if 
possible, but had to concede on this point in the end 
when it became clear that no locally-based firm could 
effectively compete with the nationwide builders for 
such a large contract. But although such compro-
111iscs had to be ,nade, the residents as a \Vhole were 
behind Calbet's scheme from the start. Instead the 
major battles to be fought were with the sub-regional 
planning authority to approve the Special Plan of In-
terior Reform (SPIR), and with the central govern-
1nenl to actually finance the sche1ne. 
The need to incorporate resident opinion into the 
planning process is of particular in1portance 110\V that 
Spain has democratically elected local as well as cen-
tral administrations. In the drawing up of the SPIR, 
public participation \Vas organized on a very ad hoc, 
if successful, basis under the direction of Cal bet's team 
of architect-planners. At local level, the formalized 
planning process remained so1newhat irrelevant, just 
as it had for different reasons in the original scheme 
in the sixties (see Figure 6). Prat Council played very 
little part in proceedings in 1976-8 and the official 
Public Information Stage held by the council in 
November 1977 was a mere formality; the real 
element of public participation had already taken place 
through the series of questionnaires, public 
exhibitions, and meetings held by Calbet. But one 
must hope that this form of resident involvement in 
the· fonnulation of planning proposals can take 
place 111ore directly \vilh the ne\v local authorities 
{do1ninated by Socialists and Co1n1nunists in the big 
cities) no\V that they are likely to play a far 1nore active 
role in urban affairs. It can also be supposed that 
local authorities at 1nunicipal and sub-regional levels 
\Vill be niore successful in 1nanaging the coordination 
of service and infrastructure provision than ,vere 
the central state authorities in San Cosine \Vhere 
en1pty spaces re1nained in 1972 \vhere a school, a day-
nursery, and the sports centre should have been. 
Finally then, what major lessons can be 
learned from the San Cosme experience that 
may be of value to planners and politicians in 
other countries, as ,vell as in Spain? First, the 
events of the seventies illustrate the value of 
careful timing and phasing of plan im-
plementation and the need for the general 
incorpo- ration of resident preferences into 
the planning and desigu processes. Second, 
the role played by Calbet's team of architect-
planners reveals the hnportance of having a 
planning tea1n co1nn1itted to the successful 
implementation of the project, which should 
ideally work within the public administration 
rather than outside it. Finally, the San 
Cosme experience as a whole highlights 
the potential dangers of heavy-handed 
central state intervention, particularly in an 
area like Catalonia which has a long history of 
anti-Centralist political activity.30 As a rule, the 
local authority will be better equipped to 
manage and coordinate housing project 
schemes if it possesses the necessary financial 
and technical resources, and if political po\ver 
is sufficiently devolved. People involved in the 
San Cosine experience have learned these 
lessons the hard way. It is hoped that this 
account may help others in sin1ilar situations to 
avoid some of the pitfalls. 
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Notes 
I. The Barcelona Provincial Plan of l 963 was one of only three 
provincial plans that were ever approved. This plan, which 
included proposals for the rcsettle1nent of 400,000 in-ntigrants 
in southern.Spain and 750,000 other Barcelonans in the Ca-
talonian Provmces, was only an "ridvisory docu1nent" without 
lhe political-ad1ni11istrative baek-uµ to nmke it a feasible prop-
osilion. At the national level, the Central Conunission of Ur· 
ban Planning was never crealcd and the National Urban Plan 
was abandoned in the early 1960s once the governn1enl cn1-
barkcd on the quadrenial National-Regional Economic Devel· 
op111e11t Plans which centered on a growlh poles policy in the 
underdeveloped soulh and west of Spain and paid little allen-
tion to the need for urban planning in the existent ntefropol-
ilan areas. 
2. The loophole was that Article IO of the 1956 act stated that 
public or private promoters could draw up local plans for "the 
dcvelopn1ent of 1nunicipal or sub-regional plans. This atn-
biguity pcnnittcd developers to use the local plan to reclassify 
land to suit their dcvelop111ent proposals. Thus, an area class-
ified as "green zone~ in a municipal or sub-regional plan 
could be rcclassilied for residential devetop1nent in a local 
plan. 
3. According to the Managentcnt Co1n1nission of the Barcelona 
Metropolitan Area. Other esti1nates put the figure as high as 
225,000. Sec Co111fr11cci611, Arq11/tecr11ra y Urbm1is1110 No. 21, Col-
egio de Apara_Jadores, Barcelona, Septen1bcr-October 1973. 
4. I 11 Lhe 111unicipaliLy of Barcelona alone, the nu1nber of in-migr-
rants averaged between 22,000 and 35,000 a year -behveen 
1954 and 1965. By the lale 1960s, the population of the sub-
region was gro\ving by 100,000 persons a year. 
5. The Law of Li1nited Cost I-lousing (Ley de Renra Limifoda) of 
I 954 introduced State subsidies and fiscal cxcmplions for the 
constructors of housing lhaL coinplied wilh dilnensional and 
111<1ximum cost specifications. The Lnw is stated in full in Boletm 
Ojicial def EMado (tvlndrid) Num 197, 16 July, 1954, pp. 
4834-4841. 
6. Decree 1622 of 4th .July 1963; stnted in full in Boletin Oficial 
de/ Estado {lvlndrid) Num 167, I) July 1963, P. 10875. 
7. The land zone classifications of the 1953 sub-regional plan 
,,,crl! subsequently grouped into three mam generic categories: 
urbm1 land, urban reserve, and rural land. To develop any 
lnnd f;illing within the last t"'O cntcgories, a local plan had first 
to be dra,vn up and approved to reclnssify the affected areris 
as urban land. All the land within the designated nrea in Prat 
wns either "Rural land" or "Urban Reserve" and so n local 
plnn was necessary, according to the Land and Urban Planning 
Act of 1956, before development of the area could proceed. 
8. Article 67 of the Land and Urb~n Planning Act of 1956 states: 
"Urban Land ,nay only be developed when each parcel of land 
can be classified as a 'plot' in accordance with the stipulations 
of Article 63 of this acl regcnding 1ninin1un1 infrastructural 
and service provision." Article 63 defined these ns being 
''road surfacing, paven1enting, v.'ater supply, sewage and 
drainage system and street lighting." The J\ct introduced the 
concept or "Roads and Services Project" to progrmn the pro-
vision of lhcsc services. The Act is stated in full in l.ey 12 1\/ayo 
/956-Regime11 def Suelo y Orde11aci611 Urbana. edited and pub-
lished by Colegio Ojicitd de Arq111tectos de Catah11ia, Bnrcclona, 
1971. 
9. The increase from 300 lo 3,000 houses bct,veenJuly 1963 and 
February 1964 seems to be explained by lhc fact that lhc July 
decree made provision for the construction of 6,500 houses in 
Han.:clona. This could have been interpreted as 1neaning only the 
municipality of Barcelona; but in Dcccn1ber, a further decree 
(No. 3681/1963) extended the area or possible location of 
these houses to include 1he entire Barcelona Sub-Region. 
Thus, although the SHA intended Lo construct 3,000 houses 
111 Prat all along, lhis was noL officially con11nunicated lo the 
Prnt Council while doubts remained about interpretation of 
the Degree of July 1963. 
10. 1\r1icle 22 or the Law or Limited Cost Housing (see note 4), 
states· 
The pro1noters or "limited cost" housing can in exceptional 
cases, acquire the necessary land through expropriation. In 
such cases lhe projecl will be declared by decree to be of 
"public utility" such a declaration can 011ly be made 
follo"ving a favourable report frmn affected Council(s) ..... 
I I . Exlract rrom lcllcr Lo Provincial Delegate of the Ministry of 
Housing, Barcelona, from Mayor of Prat Council (Mr. Maxiino 
Simon Perez), dated March 5, 1964. 
12. Extract from Jetter 10 Mayor of Prat Council from General 
Ma11Hgcr of the NII I, dated Marcil 22, 1965. 
13. The l.and and Urban Planning Act of 1956 established a 
three-phase approval process for all urban plans dra,vn up by 
public authorities. Firsl the plan was initially approved by the 
plan-1naking authority (local council, sub-regional or provin-
cial planning authority, 1ninistcrial body). It wfls lhen sub1nit-
tcd 10 the "Public Inforn1ation Stage" for'nne 1nonth, during 
which 1i111c anyone could present appeals against the plan. 
Then, if the plm1-111aking authorily was other than the local 
council an "Audience of Local Corporations" stage ,vould 
l'ollow 'tor a fi.nther 11100th, during which time the local au-
thorities could stale their cnse. The plan-1naking authority 
then pro\'isio11ally approved the plan, incorporating 1nodifica-
tions arising front the "Public Infomu1tion" and "Audience 
of Local Corporations" stages, and sub111itted it lo 1he Pro-
vincial or Sub-Regional Planning Authority for definitive ap-
proval. 
14. In fact a few 1ninor adjushnents were subsequently made, e.g., 
location of the sports center. 
IS. The gross cosl per house (including roads, service infrastruclure, 
etc.) varied between 335,000 ($5583) and 389,000 (S6483) pesetas. 
For each house there was a 30,000 peseta ($500) State subsidy 
(U.S. dollars renect 1966 exchange rates.) 
16. Report of!NCE (Iustituto Nacional de Edificac1on) on San 
Cosine undertaken on the insistence of architect Cnlbet in 
1977. Follo,ving lhc findings of this survey, the houses in the 
ne,v renewal sche1ne will have pile driven foundalions reach-
ing soine 40 1netcrs below ground level. 
17. Sec Note 13 above. 
18. In March 1974, Co111tr11ctora /11ter11acional S.A. was a,vf]rded the 
contract to undertake the first phase of repairs ,vithin a bud-
get allowance of 7.6 million pesetas. Subsequently the NIH 
drew up esli1nales for a second, larger-scale repair phase, 
which alone came to a further 151 9 1nillion pesetas. \Vilh a 
third phase also envisaged, total repair costs were cstilnnted 
at 450 million pesetas, i.e., 300,000 pesetas per house on av-
erage, almost as 1nuch as the original cost of house conlruc-
tion. 
19. Extract from letter front Mr. A. Rodriquez, Provincial Director 
of the Syndical Housing Authority, to residents' associations 
in SHt\ housing estates, in which the reply of the National 
Institute of I-lousing Lo de111ands of lhc Residents' Associa-
tions was quoted; letter dnted r-.1arch 7, 1975. 
20. Repo1t by F. Calbet Rebolto and M Valls rerrer, t\pril, l975. 
Reproduced in full in Cuadernos de Arquifecf11ra y Urbanismo No. 
107, C.O.A.C.B.,Bnrcelona, 1975. 
21. _The term "social housing" \\'as introduced to replace "state 
subsidized housing" as used in previous legislation. The 1976 
and 1977 legislation is staled in full in;lnexos Nos. TI, 12 and 
22, C.O.A.C.B.,Barcelona 1976/7. 
22. Frain Royal-Decree 2278 of 16th Septe1nber 1976, Introduc-
tory and Article 16. Stated in full in At1exos No. II (sec note 
21). 
23. Article 23 of Land and Urban Planning Reforn1 Act, approved 
by Royal-Decree 1346 on April 9, 1976. Shitcd in full in Leg-
isfac/611 def S11elo, Editorial Civitas, Madrid, 1976. 
24. The Greater· Barcelona Planning Con11uission was rena1ned the 
Metropolitan Corporation ofBarcclonn in 1974, and the internal 
ad1ninistrative structure refonned. 
25. Extract from letter to the Mayor of Prat Council from lhc 
Provincial Delegate of the Ministry of Housing, <lated August 
5, 1977. 
26. As no appeal was presented in the Public lnfonnalion Stage, 
provisional approval of the plan was not considered necessary. 
This con1mon practice a1nong most councils is aimed al cutting 
out unnecessary adn1iriistrati vc procedure. 
27. Front a telter front Mr. Alejnndro Rodriquez de Valcarcel y 
Ncbrada, President of 1hc Spanish Pt1rlimnent, to Mr. E. ·rnr-
ragona Corbelln, dated Mnrch 10, 1975. 
28. According to B01ja,]. ( 1973). 
29. Sec note 4 above. 
30. Although 1his Catalan anti-centralist feeling was clearly evi-
dent in the cmnpaign ngainst the San Cosme project conducted 
by 1he Prnl Council in the mi<l 1960s, it is i111portant lo note 
thal the Residents' Association 1novcn1ent of the 1970s in San 
Cosme (and in 1nosl other state housing areas) has been con-
ducted by and large by non-cata\ans. Of course, their protest 
cainpaigns have been anti-Madrid, but in San Cosme the ,na-
jority of residents are fro1n the south and west of Spain and 
Cnlbet is a Mntlrileno. Sm1 Cosme is not, then, nn exainplc of n 
Cn1nlan nmionalist movcn1c11t fighting repression front Madrid. It 
is nlso wortJ1 noting tlrnt the turnover of residents in San 
Cosme since it wos first occupied in the late 1960s has been 
negligible. 
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